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I.

INTRODUCTION

With the enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA),2 Congress established a deduction for 100% of the value of transfers between spouses from imposition of the estate and gift taxes,3 provided
the transfers are either outright or in appropriate form.4 The marital deduction feature of ERTA was the culmination of a policy shift in the transfer
taxation of married individuals. Although a married taxpayer would still be
taxed as an individual (for purposes of the rate table, for instance), the mar1. Kelly A. Moore is an Associate Professor at the University of Toledo College of
Law. He thanks Laura Goshe and Andrew White for their most excellent research assistance
on this Article.
2. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified
as amended in scattered statutes of 26 U.S.C. 1986).
3. S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 3, 7 (1981).
4. The appropriate form requirement reflects the determination that, although
transfer taxes will not be imposed on intra-unit transfers between spouses, transfers outside
of the unit will be subjected to the taxes. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b), 2523(b) (West 2006) (containing
terminable interest prohibitions). As a result of this determination, to be deductible, a transfer from one spouse to another must be formed to ensure it may be considered a part of the
recipient’s gross estate. See id. For example, the Code provides that a transfer in trust is
deductible if the spouse is granted a general power of appointment. See id. Such a trust is
designed to be captured in the recipient’s gross estate under I.R.C. section 2041.
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ried couple would now be treated as a unit in other transfer code provisions.5 When the modern estate tax was enacted in 1916 and the modern
gift tax was established in 1932, the taxes did not provide special treatment
for transfers from one spouse to the other.6 This changed in 19487 with the
provision of a 50% deduction for transfers between spouses, enacted in an
attempt to equalize the transfer tax treatment of married couples in separate
property states with those in community property states.8 ERTA embodied
the most recent shift in the transfer tax policy toward married individuals,
evincing the congressional determination that married individuals form
economic units and that the transfer taxes should not tax transfers between
spouses but only transfers outside of the economic unit to a third party.9
The gift tax marital deduction is provided in section 2523 of the Internal Revenue Code.10 Section 2523 provides that the value of transfers made
from one spouse to another are deductible, resulting in their subtraction
from gross gifts during the calculation of the individual spouse’s annual
taxable gifts, again, provided they are either outright transfers or made in an
appropriate form.11 Similarly, section 205612 of the Estate Tax Code provides that the value of transfers made from a decedent’s gross estate to a
surviving spouse are deductible, resulting in their removal from the decedent’s taxable estate.13 Thus, whether property is transferred to a spouse in
life or as a result of death, a taxpayer is forgiven tax liability on the value of
such transfers.14 As a result of the 100% deduction for transfers between
spouses, married individuals may avail themselves of a benefit in the tax
5. See Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA,
69 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1218 (1983).
6. Id.
7. Congress also attempted to address the imposition of the estate tax on married
individuals in community property states in 1942, but this effort was abandoned in favor of
the initial marital deduction effort in 1948. See infra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
8. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110; H.R. REP. NO. 80-1274
(1948).
9. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172,
301; S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 127 (1981) (“[H]usband and wife should be treated as one economic unit for purposes of estate and gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax purposes.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 159 (1981) (reflecting fear that inadequate tax planning could
result in spousal property being subjected to tax more than once in a spousal generation, the
determination that spouses should be able to transfer property between themselves without
imposition of the tax, and that the 100% deduction would avoid administrative difficulties of
accounting for jointly held property of spouses).
10. I.R.C. § 2523 (2006).
11. I.R.C. § 2503(a) (2006).
12. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2006).
13. I.R.C. §§ 2001(b), 2051 (2006).
14. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2051 (2006) (defining taxable estate as the gross estate minus
allowable deductions); see also I.R.C. § 2503(a) (2006) (defining taxable gift as transfers of
property by gift minus allowable deductions and exclusions).
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code that unmarried individuals may not.15 Indeed, many estate planning
techniques minimize or defer transfer tax liability by utilizing the marital
deduction provisions.16
The marital deduction provisions are part of the Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde approach to married individuals in the Transfer Tax Code.17 On the
one hand, and in addition to the marital deduction provisions, married individuals receive favorable treatment denied to unmarried individuals, such as
the ability to split gifts made by one spouse as if each spouse had made half
the value of the total gift,18 and, added most recently to the Code, the ability
of a surviving spouse to avail himself of any unused applicable exemption
amount of his most recent spouse to pass away.19 On the other hand, suspicion that a married couple may abuse certain valuation techniques otherwise available to taxpayers led to the enactment of section 2702, which
prohibits family units, including spouses, from using vulnerable valuation
techniques.20
The transfer tax’s focus on married taxpayers is similar to that of the
income tax. For instance, again in 1948, in an attempt to equalize the tax
treatment of married couples in separate property states with those in community property states, married individuals were provided the option to file
15. See Gutman, supra note 5, at 1219.
16. See, e.g., Len Cason, IRS Ruling Approves “Poorer Spouse Funding Technique,” 31 EST. PLAN. 234 (2004); Lauren Y. Detzel, The Heart of the Matter—Efficient Use
of Formula Clauses in Estate Planning, 30 INST. ON EST. P LAN. ¶ 1600 (1996); WAYNE M.
GAZUR & ROBERT M. PHILLIPS, ESTATE PLANNING: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 417-18 (2d ed.
2008).
17. See generally ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL
AND MR. HYDE 1 (1888) (Dr. Henry Jekyll was the upstanding citizen with the horrible alter
ego, Mr. Hyde).
18. I.R.C. § 2513 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-1(b) (2006) (providing a consent
procedure for married couples, under which a gift made by either spouse to a third person
can be reported as though each spouse made a gift of one-half of the transferred property).
19. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, I.R.C. §§ 2010(c)(4)-(6) (2010). With the enactment of TRA 2010, the unused applicable exclusion amount of a married individual became portable but only to the surviving
spouse. In this way, a married individual’s remaining unified credit will not evaporate at
death but instead will possibly shield his spouse’s assets from the estate tax. The provision
of portability is currently set to sunset January 1, 2013. Notwithstanding the uncertainty
stemming from the sunset provision, estate planners have been evaluating the changes portability may trigger in standard estate planning for married individuals. See, e.g., Deborah L.
Jacobs, Married with Assets, FORBES, Jan. 26, 2011 (pondering whether married individuals
should forgo certain trust-based estate planning); see also Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh,
Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage and Wealth Transfer-Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX
REV. 757, 768 (2004) (mentioning that the disclaimer provisions favor married taxpayers).
20. I.R.C. § 2702 (2006) (providing that the retained interest in a trust in which the
grantor retains the income or remainder interest is valued at zero if the interest given is given
to a family member, including the grantor’s spouse, unless one of two detailed current beneficiary terms are used in the trust).
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their taxes jointly.21 Initially, the result of the 1948 enactment was beneficial to married taxpayers with different income levels in common law
states, allowing them to split the income equally between them and take
advantage of the lower levels of the progressive rate table.22 Single taxpayers were denied such income splitting. The act placed singles at a serious
tax disadvantage, sometimes imposing a tax burden as much as 41% greater
on a single individual with an income level equal to that of a married couple.23 Eventually, in an effort to alleviate the relative burdens placed on
single and married taxpayers by the various rate tables that had subsequently been developed for the income tax, the rate tables were adjusted, resulting in the higher rate burden potentially falling upon the married taxpayers
instead of the single taxpayer: the so-called marriage penalty.24 Currently,
the code provides relief from the marriage penalty at the lower end of the
rate table.25 The current rate structure for married taxpayers also provides
the possibility for a marriage bonus in situations where married couples
with significantly different income levels are allowed to jointly file.26

21. In 1948, Congress enacted the predecessor to current section 6013 in the Revenue Act of 1948, which permitted married individuals to file a joint tax return. Revenue Act
of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110. Congress was reacting to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), in which the Court held that a wife was
taxable on one-half of the community income, even if it was earned solely by the husband.
This introduced a “geographical inequality [to the tax code], since it gave married couples in
community property states a large tax advantage over similarly situated married couples with
the same aggregate income in common law states.” Druker v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 46, 48 (2d
Cir. 1982). As a consequence of Poe, “marriage usually reduced a couple’s tax burden if
they resided in a community property state but was a neutral tax event for couples in common law states.” Id. In addition, “in community property states all married couples with the
same aggregate income paid the same tax, whereas in common law states a married couple’s
[total] tax liability depended on the amount of income each spouse earned.” Id. The Supreme
Court eventually limited the Poe holding by denying the same treatment to people living in
states which had allowed them to elect into community property treatment, as opposed to
mandating such. Id. (citing Comm’r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944)). But, such limitation
did not eliminate states’ consideration of switching to a community property system in order
to attain the associated tax benefits. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 66 (2006).
22. Druker, 697 F.2d at 48 (providing geographical uniformity for married people
in community property states and common law states and promoting horizontal equity when
comparing the aggregate income levels of married individuals in community and common
law states).
23. Id. at 48-49.
24. Id. at 49.
25. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
26. Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1517-18 (2006).
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Other examples of the Jekyll and Hyde approach taken to married individuals in the Income Tax Code include section 267,27 which denies loss
deductions in transfers between related parties, including husband and
wife,28 and section 132(h),29 which defines employee to include the employee’s spouse,30 allowing the exclusion of certain benefits bestowed on
the spouse from the actual employee’s income.31 In addition, certain provisions of subchapter J of the Code, which provides the grantor trust rules,
also focus on the tax treatment of married individuals.32
Some have argued that marriage should not be accounted for in the
Code.33 Such arguments include the assertion that because married individuals tend to have more money, the tax code should not heap additional benefits upon them.34 Similarly, it is argued that tax benefits subsidize marriage, encouraging marginal couples to get married to obtain the tax benefits.35 Further, it is asserted the focus on marriage deviates from the basic
principle that the tax code should interfere as little as possible in people’s
27. I.R.C. § 267 (2006) (“No deduction shall be allowed in respect of any loss from
the sale or exchange of property, directly or indirectly, between persons specified [in the
statute].”).
28. I.R.C. § 267(b)(1), (c)(4) (2006).
29. I.R.C. § 132(h) (2006).
30. I.R.C. § 132(h)(2)(A) (2006) (“Any use by the spouse or a dependent child of
the employee shall be treated as use by the employee.”).
31. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1)132a1 (2006) (providing an exclusion from an employee’s
gross income of the value of no additional-cost service fringe benefits, as defined in I.R.C. §
132(b) (2006)); I.R.C. § 132(a)(2) (2006) (providing an exclusion from gross income for the
value of qualified employee discounts, as defined in I.R.C. § 132(c) (2006)); see also I.R.C.
§ 119 (2006).
32. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 672(e) (2006) (treating interests held by a grantor’s spouse as
interests held by the grantor); I.R.C. § 677(a)(1) (2006). Section 677(a)(1) treats the grantor
as the owner of a trust for income tax purposes if the income of the trust, without the consent
of an adverse party, or in the discretion of a non-adverse party, may be distributed to the
grantor’s spouse. This is intended to discourage married taxpayers from gaming the income
tax system through clever trust planning. The grantor trust rules are now more commonly
triggered purposefully by taxpayers to achieve desirable estate planning results. See, e.g.,
Michael D. Milligan, Sale to a Defective Grantor Trust: An Alternative to a GRAT, 23 EST.
PLAN. 1 (1996) (discussing an estate planning technique to avoid transfer tax restrictions by
conducting transactions with a trust intentionally termed as a “grantor trust”).
33. James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, Children and
Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409, 1409 (2010); Wendy Richards, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias Perspective: It Is Time to Oust Marriage
from the Tax Code, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 611, 621 (2008); Stephen T. Black, Same-Sex Marriage and Taxes, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 327, 356-57 (2008); Margaret Ryznar, To Work, or Not
to Work? The Immortal Tax Disincentives for Married Women, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
921, 941-42 (2009); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating
Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 32 (1980).
34. Puckett, supra note 33, at 1417-19.
35. Id.
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behavior.36 It has also been argued that allocating tax burdens based on an
individual’s marital status undermines the United States’s democratic ideals.37
In an article proposing the elimination of the marital deduction provisions entirely, Professor Bridget J. Crawford described the transfer tax’s
approach as “one flesh, one taxpayer.”38 Professor Crawford deemed this
approach as “undesirable because [the transfer tax benefits] are based on
gender stereotypes and because [it denies] estate and gift tax benefits to
socially important non-marital relationships.”39 Professor Crawford proposed that gratuitous transfers between spouses be fully taxable, but the
amount an individual may transfer free of transfer tax considerations be
increased to eliminate the associated complexity of such an approach from
the Code.40 Professor Crawford also observed that removing the marital
deduction provisions from the Code would eliminate a “powerful incentive”
for spousal transfers that would not otherwise be made, which would tend
to simplify and ease the costs of administration of the tax system.41
Others have embraced the use of marriage as a factor in allocating tax
burdens,42 arguing that if we were to eliminate marriage benefits in the
code, we would invite a flood of potential interspousal tax avoidance
schemes.43 The argument continues that, because of the complexity of the
tax code and budgetary constraints on the IRS, it would be difficult to detect the schemes and enforce the code.44
Still others are either neutral toward the use of marriage in the tax code
or call for further study.45 For instance, Great Britain has an individual taxation system, not allowing married taxpayers to aggregate their tax attributes.46 It has been proposed that a comparative study between the U.S. sys36. Motro, supra note 26, at 1529 n.67.
37. See Jessica Knouse, Civil Marriage: Threat to Democracy, 18 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 361 (2012).
38. Crawford, supra note 19, at 760 & n.8.
39. Id. at 760 (amount that can pass tax free is referred to as the Unified Credit); see
id. at 787 & n.160.
40. Id. Professor Crawford further observed that the increased Unified Credit
amount would alleviate the disparities between married individuals in community property
states and common law property states. Id. at 803.
41. Id. at 801-02.
42. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of
Money) Have to Do with Joint Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 718 (2011).
43. See id.; Motro, supra note 26, at 1551.
44. See McMahon, supra note 42, at 741.
45. See Joel S. Newman, Taxation of Households: A Comparative Study, 55 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 129, 152-53 (2010); Stephanie Hunter McMahon, London Calling: Does the
U.K.’s Experience with Individual Taxation Clash with the U.S.’s Expectations?, 55 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 159, 217-20 (2010).
46. McMahon, supra note 45, at 170.
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tem and the individual system be conducted to determine the consequences
that may stem from shifting to an individual system. 47 For instance, does an
individual taxation system tend to trigger a redistribution of property within
the marital unit?48 Further, do we want a system that promotes such redistribution?49 A discussion of the income tax provisions related to marriage is
beyond the scope of this Article.50
A primary justification for bestowing benefits on married taxpayers in
the income and transfer tax systems, currently, is the policy pronouncement
that married individuals constitute economic units and should not be required to account for intramarriage transfers, but only for transfers outside
of the economic unit.51 The characterization of married individuals as economic units is the subject of much criticism, including the assertion that
married couples do not always function as economic units.52 No baseline of
economic activity has been legislated by which to measure whether married
individuals are functioning as an economic unit. The mere fact of marriage
acts as a proxy, leading to the presumption that the married taxpayers are
functioning as an economic unit.53 Once presumed, the tax code bestows
certain benefits and imposes certain restrictions on the married taxpayers.54
Professor Crawford’s conclusion includes the observation that “[t]reating
husband and wife—or any two taxpayers—as a single economic unit is
inconsistent with the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship as they
have evolved over time.”55
To be considered an economic unit, there is no requirement that the
secondary earner in the marriage have a legal entitlement to the primary
earner’s money.56 The married individuals may maintain separate bank accounts, and the marriage may be governed by a prenuptial agreement.57 In
the sense that the economic unit presumption allows transfer tax benefits to
married individuals who are not actually functioning as an economic unit,
however measured, the economic unit justification is applied too broadly.58

47. See id. at 165.
48. See id. at 207.
49. See id.
50. For a discussion of a proposal to remove marriage as a proxy for economic unit
status for purposes of joint filing provisions, see Motro, supra note 26, at 1543-53.
51. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1274.
52. See Motro, supra note 26, at 1512; Richards, supra note 33, at 621.
53. See Crawford, supra note 19, at 805; Motro, supra note 26, at 1541.
54. See Crawford, supra note 19, at 805.
55. Id.
56. Richards, supra note 33, at 621; Motro, supra note 26, at 1532.
57. Richards, supra note 33, at 621.
58. See id.
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The use of only marriage as a proxy for an economic unit has also
been criticized.59 To the extent unmarried (by choice or otherwise), yet
committed couples actually function as an economic unit, they are denied
these tax benefits, even though they may qualify under the underlying economic unit justification.60 In that sense, the justification is applied too narrowly.61 Given the lack of a baseline of economic activity by which to
measure whether a couple is functioning as an economic unit, these unmarried, yet committed couples are unable to prove they are otherwise entitled
to the related benefits.62
To be sure, the Jekyll approach is more generous than the Hyde approach is restrictive. The focus on marriage and reliance on the economic
unit presumption is firmly entrenched in the tax code. This Article joins the
chorus of those criticizing the use of the economic unit presumption, using
a song sheet involving prenuptial agreements to do so. To make this criticism, this Article considers a discrete question: Should married individuals
be able to avail themselves of the 100% estate tax marital deduction when
their marriage is governed by a prenuptial agreement?63 Put another way,
should the existence of a prenuptial agreement ever rebut the economic unit
presumption? Or, do the elements of simplicity and administrative ease
gained through the use of the economic unit presumption still support the
presumption even if there is a written agreement undercutting, in some
fashion, the existence of an economic unit? The 100% marital deduction
provides a benefit to married individuals. Should they be allowed this benefit if they have avoided the burdens associated with marriage, in some manner, by executing a prenuptial agreement?64 In considering this discrete
question, the use of marriage as the only proxy for the economic unit pre59. See id. at 636. In Mueller v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court affirmed that
reliance on state-sanctioned marriage for joint filing purposes did not violate the due process
clause. Mueller v. Comm’r, 537 U.S. 1003 (2002). The court agreed with the Tax Court’s
findings that Congress had a rational basis for determining that married units had greater
financial burdens. Mueller v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (T.C. 2001). However, the Tax
Court’s focus was on contemporary economic considerations and left open the possibility
that these considerations could lead Congress eventually to extend the benefits of joint filing
to unmarried economic units: “[W]hether policy considerations warrant narrowing of the gap
between the tax treatment of married taxpayers and homosexual and other nonmarried economic partners is for Congress to determine in light of all relevant legislative considerations.” Id. at 2.
60. See Motro, supra note 26, at 1512.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. For convenience, although the questions may be similar, this Article references
only prenuptial agreements, not post nuptial agreements. See generally Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827 (2007).
64. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an
Old Rule, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 386-90 (2005-06).
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sumption is accepted. Given the lack of a baseline of economic activity
between spouses with which to determine if they actually function as economic units, the use of marriage as a proxy for the economic unit presumption adds an element of simplicity to the Transfer Tax Code and eases enforcement concerns associated with determining the transfer tax consequences of intramarriage transfers.65 For discussion purposes, the use of the
economic presumption is accepted, generally, outside of the context of marriages governed by prenuptial agreements.
It is recognized that the discussion herein may be applicable to the
broader question of whether any of the marriage-related benefits should be
allowed to individuals married pursuant to a prenuptial agreement. As a
corollary question, it could be asked whether the valuation restrictions of
section 2702, for instance, should apply to individuals married pursuant to a
prenuptial agreement.66 The article’s conclusion regarding the discrete
question presented suggests these two questions should be answered in the
negative.
Parts III, IV, and V of the Article discuss the evolution, basic mechanics, and related estate planning uses of the 100% estate tax marital deduction. Part V discusses the use of marriage as the proxy for the economic
unit presumption. Part VI briefly discusses the history of prenuptial agreements and common tax-related terms of such agreements. Part VII discusses whether the economic unit presumption should be treated as rebutted if
there is a prenuptial agreement, leading to a disallowance of the estate tax
marital deduction. Part VIII concludes that, although such a disallowance
may be justifiable for certain policy reasons, it would add too much complexity to the tax code, with attendant compliance difficulties, to do so.
II.

ESTATE TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION: HISTORY

The modern estate tax was enacted in 1916 to raise revenue as America prepared to enter World War I.67 Congress enacted the gift tax in 1932 to
prevent avoidance of the estate tax through inter vivos giving. 68 Despite the
revenue-raising rationale that gave rise to the estate tax and the complementary gift tax,69 the stronger historic and long-stated primary purpose of the
65. See McMahon, supra note 42, at 718.
66. See Motro, supra note 26, at 1551 (marriage-based tax restrictions should not
apply if the taxpayers may not jointly file).
67. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80.
68. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154, §§ 501-32, 47 Stat. 169, 245; H.R. REP.
NO. 72-708, at 28 (1932) (Conf. Rep.); see Ray G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakey, The Revenue
Act of 1932, 22 AM. ECON. R. 620, 623 (1932).
69. The generation-skipping transfer tax, enacted in 1986, was designed to prevent
avoidance of the estate tax through trust devices that allowed a decedent to leave a series of
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estate tax has been to break up large concentrations of wealth. One scholar
articulated this goal as: “The purpose of [the transfer taxes] is not to raise
revenue (release resources to the government) but gradually and continually
to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power
detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.”70
The estate tax and gift tax were in pari materia,71 but they were not
united, initially, as each had its own rules, regulations, and rate tables.72
Though not united, generally, they did share a common feature: neither tax
provided special treatment for transfers between spouses.73 The absence of
such provisions led to disparate treatment of the estates of deceased individuals leaving a surviving spouse in community property estates with the
estates of such individuals in common law property states.74 The disparate
treatment was the result of the split of community property at death, allowing half of the decedent’s wealth to pass to his surviving spouse by operation of law, outside of the transfer tax system.75 If a decedent in a common
law state wanted half of his property to pass to his surviving spouse, he
could arrange his affairs to accomplish such, but the property would pass
through his gross estate and be subjected to the estate tax system.76
For example, assuming an estate tax regime with a flat 50% estate tax
rate and without any available credits or deductions, a decedent in a comlife estates to successive generations, thereby providing descendants with the fruit of the
family fortune, but never giving them enough of an interest in it to subject the trust property
to the estate tax at the death of each generation. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99514, §§ 1431-33, 100 Stat. 2085, 2717-32. The passage of the generation-skipping transfer
tax completed the transfer tax triumvirate.
70. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971) (alteration in original). This
statement is consistent with the testimony of U.S. Representative Robert Kean before the
Ways and Means Committee, where he approved of the tax solely because it functioned to
“‘prevent[] the piling up of too big estates.’” Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the
Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 224 (1955) (quoting Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways
and Means on Revenue Revision of 1950, 81st Cong. 125 (1950)). He repeated this sentiment
in 1951 by saying, “‘[The estate tax] was not chiefly for the production of revenue, but rather for a social benefit, in order not to allow these great piles of capital to grow and grow.’”
Id. at 224 n.6 (quoting Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1951, 82d Cong. 68 (1951)).
71. Statutes in pari materia are those related to the same person or thing or having a
common purpose. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979); see Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1933) (“The two statutes are plainly in pari materia.”).
72. Eisenstein, supra note 70, at 224.
73. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80; Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154, §§ 501-32, 47 Stat. 169, 245; H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 28
(1932) (Conf. Rep.); see Crawford, supra note 19, at 762-64.
74. See Eisenstein, supra note 70, at 224; Crawford, supra note 19, at 762-64.
75. See Eisenstein, supra note 70, at 224; Crawford, supra note 19, at 762-64.
76. Eisenstein, supra note 70, at 224.
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munity property state with title to community property valued at $2,000,000
would only have a taxable estate for estate tax purposes of $1,000,000. This
is because the community property laws provide that half of his community
property belongs to his surviving spouse, passing not from the decedent’s
gross estate but by operation of state law.77 The $1,000,000 taxable estate
would be subjected to the estate tax, resulting in a $500,000 estate tax liability. By contrast, an individual in a common law state with title to
$2,000,000 would have a taxable estate of $2,000,000, as nothing would be
deemed the property of his surviving spouse by operation of law.78 This
$2,000,000 estate would be subjected to the estate tax, resulting in an estate
tax liability of $1,000,000. Considering the estate tax rates were progressive, the benefit of this disparate treatment to estates in community property
states was even greater.79
This disparity also manifested itself in imposition of the gift tax and
income tax. A transfer of community property as a gift was treated as if
each spouse had made half of the gift, allowing the value of half of the gift
to be taxed at lower marginal rates by each spouse.80 By contrast, again, a
gift of separately titled property in a common law state was taxed solely to
the person making the transfer.81 In income tax, the income earned by one
spouse in a community property state was split between husband and wife,
allowing each spouse to pay taxes based on half of the amount of the total
income, taking twice the advantage of the lower marginal rates.82 If both
spouses in either jurisdiction had similar wealth levels and income levels,
the imposition of the tax laws was more or less neutral, but otherwise couples in community property systems were favored over those in common
law jurisdictions.83
Congress attempted to resolve the associated estate tax disparities in
1942.84 The 1942 estate tax amendments required all of a decedent’s community property, including the portion that passed to the surviving spouse
by operation of law, to be included in the estate of the first spouse to die,
unless the property was attributable to the services or property of the surviving spouse.85 This approach ordinarily required all of the community
property to be included in the gross estate of the husband.86 If the wife
77. See JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY
ESTATE PLANNING § 5.2 (Tina Portuondo ed., 2007 ed. 2007).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Druker v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1982).
83. See id.
84. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798.
85. PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 77, § 5.2.1.
86. Id.
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passed first, one-half of the community property was included in her gross
estate given that she held a power of testamentary disposition over her half
of the community property.87
The 1942 estate tax amendments were unpopular in community property states, not surprisingly given the amendments subjected more of their
property transfers to imposition of the tax and did not address the treatment
of taxpayers in common law states.88 In addition, the 1942 enactment did
not alleviate the disparate treatment associated with the imposition of the
income tax.89 The income tax advantages offered to community property
couples eventually influenced six jurisdictions to adopt community property
systems between 1945 and 1947 (Hawaii, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Pennsylvania).90 As a result of congress’s 1948 adoption of the
limited marital deduction and related modifications to the gift and income
taxes, each of these six states reverted to common law property systems.91
The 1948 enactment established a deduction for transfers to surviving
spouses, limited to 50% of the deceased spouse’s adjusted gross estate.92
The adjusted gross estate was the result of subtracting from the gross estate
the value of any community property included in the gross estate and the
portion of deductions under sections 205393 and 205494 attributable to the
noncommunity property.95 As a general matter, a deduction was allowed if
the property was transferred to a surviving spouse in a manner that would
make it includible in the survivor’s gross estate when he or she died.96
The 1948 enactment also created a deduction for 50% of the value of
gifts made from one spouse to the other and introduced split gifts to the gift
tax system, allowing a spouse to treat a gift made by one as if made one87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 77, § 5.2.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 5.2.2.
93. I.R.C. § 2053 (2006) (providing deduction from the gross estate for administrative expenses).
94. I.R.C. § 2054 (2006) (providing deduction for the estate for certain losses, such
as those caused by fire).
95. See Revenue Act of 1948, I.R.C. § 2506(c) (amended 1976). As an example,
assume a decedent left a gross estate of $800,000 in noncommunity property. The decedent’s
estate was allowed a total of $40,000 of deductions under section 2053. The decedent left
$25,000 to a charity, for which a deduction under section 2055 was allowable, and the balance of the estate to his wife. The maximum allowable marital deduction was limited to
$380,000 (one-half of the decedent’s adjusted gross estate) calculated as follows: gross
estate of $800,000 less the section 2053 deduction of $40,000 resulted in an adjusted gross
estate of $760,000, multiplied by 50%, determining that the maximum marital deduction
amount was $380,000. PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 77, ex. 5-1.
96. Revenue Act of 1948, I.R.C. § 2506(c) (amended 1976).
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half by each.97 In community property states, a gift of community property
by one spouse to a third party was treated as if each spouse had made half
of the gift. For example, assuming there were no deductions or exclusions
available, if a husband had title to and transferred property valued at
$100,000 to a third party, the wife would be treated as having made a
$50,000 taxable gift, and the husband would be treated as if he transferred a
taxable gift of only $50,000, allowing each to take advantage of the lower
portions of the progressive rate schedule. By contrast, a spouse making a
$100,000 gift in a common law state would be taxed on the entire transfer.
The split gift provisions, currently contained in section 2513,98 afford the
married taxpayers in common law states to elect the same treatment provided as a result of underlying property law to the married taxpayers in community property states.99 From a theoretical standpoint, the split gift provisions were rendered unnecessary by the eventual enactment of the 100%
marital deduction: one could transfer half of the value of the intended gift to
a third party to his spouse, transfer tax free, and then the spouse could make
the actual transfer to the third party, rather than only elect to be treated as if
she had done so. Perhaps for reasons of practicality, however, the provision
persists.100
Regarding transfer taxes, the purpose of the 1948 amendments was to
“equalize the effect of the estate taxes in community property and commonlaw jurisdictions.”101 While it is true the estate tax marital deduction was
available to estates of decedents where separate property had been held in a
community property state, the guiding objective involved providing decedents in common law states with the ability to mimic the advantages of
“estate splitting” allowed to decedents in community property states.102 A
key feature of the 50% estate tax marital deduction was that it allowed taxes
to be deferred, not avoided. The deduction was only available if the subject
property transferred to the surviving spouse was transferred in a manner

97. Estate planning use of split gifts is discussed infra at notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
98. I.R.C. § 2513 (2006). Section 2513(a)(1) provides:
A gift made by one spouse to any person other than his spouse shall, for
the purposes of this chapter, be considered as made one-half by him and
one-half by his spouse, but only if at the time of the gift each spouse is a
citizen or resident of the United States.
I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1) (2006). The split gift provision only applies if both spouses consent to so
sharing the value of all gifts to third parties made in a given tax year. I.R.C. §
2513(a)(2)2513a2 (2006).
99. PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 77, § 5.2.2.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963).
102. Id.
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that would render it includible in the surviving spouse’s gross estate.103 In
that manner, the tax was deferred, not avoided, and the value would potentially be subjected to the estate tax upon the death of the surviving spouse.
The income tax disparity was addressed by allowing married individuals to
file joint returns, aggregating their gross income and applying preferential
tax rates.104
In 1976, Congress tinkered with the marital deduction, increasing the
quantitative limit of the deduction to either $250,000 or half of the decedent’s gross estate, whichever was higher.105 In effect, to the extent of
$250,000, married individuals were treated as an economic unit for estate
tax purposes at this time. With the Tax Reform Act of 1976,106 Congress
endeavored to unify the separate estate and gift tax systems. 107 The 1976
Act equalized the rate structures, created the unified credit,108 and updated
the transfer tax consequences of gifts made within three years of death.109
The purpose of unification was to equalize the transfer tax burden on transfers of the same amount of wealth, whether made inter vivos or at death.110
The 1976 Act did not completely unify the estate and gift taxes.
Among other disparities between the estate and gift tax were the different
marital-deduction provisions under each.111 Recognizing these disparities,
Congress enacted ERTA in 1981.112 ERTA introduced the unlimited marital
deduction to both taxes, thereby further unifying the two taxes.113

103. Id.
104. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
105. Gutman, supra note 5, at 1220 n.128.
106. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
107. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380, at 3, 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356-57,
3360. Congress also enacted the first generation-skipping transfer tax (GST) with this measure. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006, 90 Stat. 1520. This initial GST
was retroactively repealed, and a substitute was enacted in 1986. See Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1431-33, 100 Stat. 2085, 2717-32.
108. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
109. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520.
110. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3360.
111. Compare Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520
(estate-tax marital deduction), with id. § 2002(b) (gift-tax marital deduction).
112. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
113. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2056 (2006)); DAVID JOULFAIAN, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS,
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OTA PAPER 100, THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX: HISTORY, LAW, AND
ECONOMICS 6 (2007). At the same time, however, the 1981 Act disunified the taxes further
by increasing the annual exclusion from $3,000 to $10,000 under the gift tax and creating
unlimited gift-tax exclusions for transfers made on behalf of another as payment for his
education or healthcare. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441, 95
Stat. 172 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2503(b), (e)). In order to “qualify” for the deduction, the transferor must make the payment directly to the beneficiary’s educational institu-
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Congress stated the 100% marital deduction was justified because
husband and wife constitute one economic unit and should not be required
to account independently for transfers made between the members of the
unit.114 Further, Congress believed a 100% marital deduction would alleviate certain difficulties associated with imposing the estate tax on property
that had been held jointly by the spouses.115 As with the 50% marital deduction, property received by the surviving spouse for whom the value was
allowed a 100% marital deduction was required to be transferred in a manner that would make it includible in the survivor’s gross estate.116
Congress first addressed the concern regarding jointly held spousal
property in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, with the enactment of section
2040(b), but refined its approach in the ERTA.117 Section 2040(b) provides
special gross estate inclusion rules for married taxpayers in regards to property the decedent held with his surviving spouse in joint names with right of
survivorship or in tenancies by the entirety.118 Section 2040(b) allows married taxpayers to avoid the general approach to such properties provided in
section 2040(a).119
The standard approach regarding gross estate inclusion of property in
which the decedent was a joint owner with right of survivorship instructs
the inclusion of the portion of the date-of-death value of such property according to the percentage of the consideration the decedent had provided.120
For instance, if the decedent provided the entire purchase price for the
property, the value of the entire property is in his estate.121 If the decedent
provided no part of the consideration but one of the other joint owners provided the entire consideration, no part of the value of the property is included in the decedent’s gross estate.122 If the decedent and his two brothers, for
example, acquired the property via gift, only one-third of the property
would be included in his gross estate.123 The focus on who provided the
consideration for the jointly held property in section 2040(a) can lead to
tion or healthcare provider, as the case may be. See I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2). The 1981 Act provided no parallel provisions for the estate tax.
114. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat.
172, 301 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 127 (1981).
115. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172,
301 (1981).
116. Gutman, supra note 5, at 1220 n.128.
117. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520; Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
118. I.R.C. § 2040(b) (2006).
119. I.R.C. § 2040(a) (2006); I.R.C. § 2040(b) (2006).
120. I.R.C. § 2040(a) (2006).
121. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c)(1) (1958).
122. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a)(2), (c)(1) (1958).
123. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c)(8) (1958).
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difficult tracing problems. For example, in situations where the decedent
provided the other joint owner via gift with part of the consideration paid
by the other joint owner, some portion of that prior gift may be deemed
consideration paid by the decedent, triggering a proportionate inclusion of
the date-of-death value of the property in the decedent’s gross estate.124
Congress enacted section 2040(b) because it determined the necessary
tracing was particularly vexing when the joint property was held within the
marriage.125 If the decedent held property jointly with only his surviving
spouse or in tenancies by the entirety, section 2040(b) provides that only
half of the property is in the decedent’s gross estate, alleviating the need to
trace the source of the consideration.126 Section 2040(b) treats married taxpayers as economic units and was enacted to “implicitly recognize the services furnished by a spouse toward the accumulation of jointly owned
property even though the monetary value of the services cannot be accurately determined.”127
The economic unit justification is a presumption that husband and wife
own and control all of the income and share the burdens of marriage equally, regardless of who earns the income or who incurs the burdens.128 In considering the 100% marital deduction features as part of the potential unification of the transfer tax systems in 1969, the Treasury Department stated:
It does not appear, then, that transfers of property between
husband and wife are appropriate occasions for imposing
the tax. An especially difficult burden may be imposed by
the tax when property passes to a widow, particularly if
there are minor children. The present system of taxing
124. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c)(4)-(5) (1958); see, e.g., Estate of Goldsborough v.
Comm’r, 70 T.C. 1077 (1978), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1982).
125. S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 127 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105.
126. I.R.C. § 2040(b) (2006).
127. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380, at 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356. A
1981 congressional report provides:
The committee believes that a husband and wife should be treated
as one economic unit for purposes of estate and gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax purposes. Accordingly, no tax should be imposed
on transfers between a husband and wife.
Moreover, the committee believes that the taxation of jointly held
property between spouses is complicated unnecessarily. Often such assets are purchased with joint funds making it difficult to trace individual
contributions. . . . Accordingly, the committee believes it appropriate to
adopt an easily administered rule under which each spouse would be
considered to own one-half of jointly held property regardless of which
spouse furnished the consideration for the property.
S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 127 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105.
128. Motro, supra note 26, at 1512, 1518.
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transfers between spouses does not accord with the common understanding of most husbands and wives that the
property they have accumulated is “ours.” Furthermore, the
distinctions drawn by existing law between transfers which
qualify for the marital deduction and those which do not
qualify have generated drafting complexities, artificial
limitations upon dispositions, and considerable litigation.129
The recognition of this economic unit initially extended to individuals
with foreign spouses.130 In 1988, however, Congress enacted the Technical
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act, limiting the deduction amount and availability for transfers to non-citizen spouses to insure subsequent transfers out
of the unit would be taxed.131
III.

ESTATE TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION: BASIC MECHANICS OF THE
100% MARITAL DEDUCTION

The estate tax marital deduction is provided in section 2056.132 Section
2056(a) provides a deduction for 100% of the value of interests in property
passing from a decedent to his surviving spouse to the extent the value is
included in the decedent’s gross estate and subject to various limitations.133
These limitations render the value of an interest passing to a surviving
spouse either deductible or nondeductible.134 An interest passing to a surviving spouse will be deemed deductible, unless the interest was not included in the decedent’s gross estate; the subject interest was otherwise deductible under either sections 2053 (deduction for administrative expenses) or
2054 (loss deductions), or the interest is a terminable interest, as defined by
section 2056(b) and Treasury Regulation 20.2056(b)-1.135
The most difficult of these limitations is the terminable interest rule.136
The terminable interest rule provides that “[w]here, on the lapse of time, on
the occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or
129. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, 91ST CONG., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, 358 (Comm. Print 1969).
130. I.R.C. § 2523 (1986).
131. I.R.C. § 2523(i) (2008) (effective Nov. 10, 1988).
132. I.R.C. § 2056 (2006).
133. Id.
134. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-2(a) (1958) (“Property interests which passed from a
decedent to his surviving spouse fall within two general categories: (1) Those with respect to
which the marital deduction is authorized, and (2) Those with respect to which the marital
deduction is not authorized,” referred to as “deductible interests” and on “deductible interests.”).
135. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-2(b) (1958).
136. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)(1) (1958).
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contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed . . . with respect to such interest,”
if (i) an interest in the property passes for less than adequate consideration
from the decedent to any person other than the surviving spouse and (ii)
such other person or his heirs or assigns may possess such interest after
such failure.137 This rule has been referred to as a “thicket.”138 The purpose
of the terminable interest rule is to assure that an interest in property, the
value of which was granted a deduction in the estate of the first spouse to
die, is given in a manner that makes it includible in the estate of the surviving spouse.139 The IRS has been admonished not to exalt literal statutory
arguments regarding the terminable interest rule over an inquiry into
whether the interest will be includible in the survivor’s estate.140
Not all terminable interests are nondeductible.141 For example, if a decedent bequeaths a patent to his surviving spouse and a third party as tenants in common, the decedent’s estate will be allowed a deduction for the
value of the patent interest passing to the surviving spouse.142 The interest
in the surviving spouse will terminate upon the expiration of the patent, but
it will not pass to the third party as a result.143 Because the property will not
pass to the third party upon this expiration, it is not a nondeductible terminable interest.144

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.

142.
143.
144.

Id.
Allen v. United States, 359 F.2d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 1966).
Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 565 F.2d 455, 459 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(d) (1958).
A property interest passing to decedent’s surviving spouse is deductible .
. . even though it is a terminable interest, and even though an interest
therein passed from the decedent to another person, if it is a terminable
interest only because—
(1) It is conditioned on the spouse’s surviving for a limited period in
the manner described in 20.2056(b)-3;
(2) It is a right to income for life with a general power of appointment,
meeting the requirements set forth in20.2056(b)-(5);
(3) It consists of life insurance or annuity payments held by the insurer
with a general power of appointment in the spouse, meeting the requirements set forth in 20.2056(b)-6;
(4) It is a qualified terminable interest property, meeting the requirements set forth in 20.2056(b)-7; or
(5) It is an interest in a qualified charitable remainder trust in which the
spouse is the only non-charitable beneficiary, meeting the requirements
set forth in20.2056(b)-8.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(g), ex. 6 (1958).
Id.
Id.
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The following is an example of a nondeductible terminable interest. A
deceased spouse devised real property to a trust for the lifetime benefit of
his surviving spouse, with the remainder to his heirs. The decedent passed
an interest in the property to both his surviving spouse and another person,
terminating the trust at the occurrence of the surviving spouse’s death and
allowing the remainder person to enjoy and possess the property as a result
of the survivor’s death.145 Also, upon the surviving spouse’s death, there
will be no attributes associated with this trust that would trigger gross estate
inclusion.
Section 2056(b), in addition to providing the terminable interest rule,
also provides exceptions to the terminable interest rule.146 For instance,
section 2056(b)(5) provides that if the surviving spouse is given a general
power of appointment over the property in the trust described above to appoint the property either to herself or her estate, the trust will be a deductible interest.147 If such a power is given, the trust will be in the estate of the
survivor by virtue of section 2041, which includes property over which a
decedent possessed a general power of appointment in his or her gross estate.148 In addition to granting the surviving spouse a general power of appointment, to claim a deduction by virtue of 2056(b)(5) the terms of the
trust must satisfy the following:
(1) The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all of
the income from the entire interest of a specific portion of
the entire interest, or to a specific portion of all the income
from the entire interest.
(2) The income payable to the surviving spouse must be
payable annually or at more frequent intervals.
(3) . . .
(4) . . .
(5) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable
by her alone and (whether exercisable by will or during
life) must be exercisable in all events.
(6) The entire interest or the specific portion must not be
subject to any power in any other person to appoint any

145.
146.
147.
148.

See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(g), ex. 1 (1958).
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(d) (1958).
I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (2006).
I.R.C. § 2041 (2006).
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part to any person other than the surviving spouse.149
Another exception to the terminable interest rule is to elect to designate property as qualified terminable interest property (QTIP). 150 QTIP is
property that passes from the decedent in which the surviving spouse has a
qualifying income interest for life151 and regarding which an appropriate
election is made.152 The required election must be made by the executor of
the decedent’s estate. If such an election is made, the property interest will
be includible in the estate of the surviving spouse pursuant to section
2044.153 The above-described trust could be the subject of the marital deduction, therefore, if the decedent’s executor so elects. As a result, the dateof-death value of the trust would be includible in the survivor’s estate pursuant to section 2044 upon her death.154
The QTIP exception to the terminable interest rule was added to the
Code in 1981.155 It was enacted due to Congress’s concern that the only
methods available by which a decedent could avail the marital deduction
entailed relinquishing dispositive power to the surviving spouse, perhaps to
the detriment to the decedent’s descendants.156 Congress stated:
[T]he limitations on the nature of interests [currently] qualifying for the marital deduction should be liberalized to
permit certain transfers of terminable interests to qualify
for the marital deduction. Under [existing] law, the marital
deduction is available only with respect to property passing
outright to the spouse or in specified forms [providing] the
spouse control over the transferred property. Because the
149. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (1958).
150. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (2006).
151. This is defined in section 2056(b)(7)(B)(i) as an income interest granting the
surviving spouse an entitlement to all of the income from the property, payable annually or
in more frequent intervals, or as a usufruct interest for life in the property, and over which no
person has a power to appoint any of the property to a person other than the spouse (not
including a power exercisable only after the surviving spouse has died). I.R.C. §
2056(b)(7)(B)(i) (2006).
152. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i) (2006).
153. I.R.C. § 2044 (2006). If the surviving spouse attempts to relinquish her qualifying income interest during life, section 2519 increases the value of her gross gifts by the
date-of-gift value of the trust interest beyond the value of the income interest. I.R.C. § 2519
(2006); see also I.R.C. § 2519 (triggering gift tax consequences if the surviving spouse divests herself of the income interest inter vivos).
154. I.R.C. § 2044 (2006) (providing that the gross estate includes the value of property in which the decedent had a qualifying income interest that had been the subject of a
section 2056(b)(7) deduction (QTIP deduction)).
155. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
156. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201 (1981).
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surviving spouse [must] be given control over the property,
the decedent [was not certain] that the spouse will subsequently pass the property to his children. Because the maximum marital deduction is limited under current law to
one-half of decedent’s adjusted gross estate, a decedent at
least could control the [ultimate] disposition of one-half of
his estate and still maximize current tax benefits. However,
unless certain interests which do not grant the spouse total
control are eligible for the unlimited marital deduction, a
decedent would be forced to choose between surrendering
control of his entire estate to avoid imposition of the estate
tax at his death or reducing his tax benefits at his death to
insure inheritance by the children. The committee believes
that the tax laws should be neutral and that tax consequences should not control an individual’s disposition of property.157
As the forgoing makes clear, a host of complex rules and regulations
must be considered when planning to obtain an estate tax marital deduction.
If a transfer runs afoul of the terminable interest rule or fails to satisfy one
of the exceptions to that rule, an estate may lose the benefit of the deduction. If the rules and regulations are satisfied, however, married taxpayers
are given beneficial estate planning options that single taxpayers are not.158
IV.

ESTATE TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION: GENERAL ESTATE PLANNING
CONSIDERATIONS

A discussion of the use of the marital deduction provisions in estate
planning requires a review of the unified credit provisions of the taxes.159
Section 2010 provides a credit of the “applicable credit amount” against the
estate tax.160 The applicable credit amount is equal to the amount of the
tentative tax that would be determined on the “applicable exclusion
amount,” currently $5,000,000.161 Section 2505 provides a credit against the
gift tax, also currently based on the applicable exclusion amount of
$5,000,000.162 Effectively, the two credits work within the framework of
the transfer tax system to allow a taxpayer to transfer a cumulative total of
157. Id.
158. Cason, supra note 16, at 234.
159. See, e.g., Sebastian V. Grassi, Jr., Drafting Flexibility into Estate Planning
Documents After the 2001 Tax Act, 17 PRAC. TAX LAW., no. 2, Winter 2003, at 1, 7.
160. I.R.C. § 2010 (2006).
161. I.R.C. § 2010 (2006).
162. I.R.C. § 2505 (2006).
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property valued at $5,000,000 (currently)—in life or at death—free of the
transfer tax.163 Once the unified credit amount, also known as the exemption equivalent or exclusion, is exhausted, any taxable transfer of property
thereafter generates a transfer tax liability.164
The credit was introduced into the estate and gift taxes in 1976, replacing exemptions that had previously existed in both the estate and gift taxes,
as part of an effort to unify the two taxes.165 From 1977 to 2004, the credit
was the same for both the estate and gift tax.166 Initially, in 1977, the credit
allowed an exemption equivalent of $120,667. The exemption equivalent
rose significantly over the years until 2001 when the amount was set at
$1,000,000 for both the gift and estate taxes.167
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act
(EGTRRA) set in motion a separation of the estate tax and the gift tax,
eventually leading to the temporary repeal of the estate tax in 2010.168 As
part of this separation, EGTRRA uncoupled the unified credit amounts of
the estate tax and gift tax.169 The EGTRRA set the gift tax unified credit at
a constant $1,000,000.170 The estate tax amount was set at $1,000,000 for
2002-2003, $1,500,000 for 2004-2005, $2,000,000 for 2006-2008, and
$3,500,000 for 2009.171 The increase in the estate tax unified credit from
2002-2009 was based on the desire to incentivize taxpayer saving, capital
formation, and entrepreneurial activity.172
Pursuant to the EGTRRA, the estate tax was repealed in 2010, but for
obscure parliamentary reasons, the repeal was only for one year, and the
estate tax was to be revived at 2001 levels, effective January 1, 2011. 173
After the repeal was triggered in 2010, Congress debated various approach163. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2001 (EGTRRA),
H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 35 (2001) (Conf. Rep.).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. EGTRRA, H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 4 (2001) (Conf. Rep.) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); I.R.C. § 2001(c) (2000).
169. EGTRRA, H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 35 (2001) (Conf. Rep.); I.R.C. § 2010(c)
(2006).
170. In addition, EGTRRA restated the gift tax rate table. EGTRRA, H.R. REP. NO.
107-84, at 33, 35 (2001) (Conf. Rep.); I.R.C. §§ 2001(c), 2505(a)(1) (2006).
171. EGTRRA, H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 35 (2001) (Conf. Rep.); I.R.C. § 2010(c)
(2006).
172. EGTRRA, H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 35 (2001) (Conf. Rep.).
173. See ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30862, THE BUDGET
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 14-15 (2009), available at
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/assets/pdf/D2152590225.PDF (describing the effect of
the Byrd Rule in encouraging the addition of sunset provisions to bills so that only a simple
majority of affirmative votes is necessary for the bill to pass).
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es to preventing a reimposition of the tax at 2001 levels, ranging from outright repeal to a return to the 2009 levels.174 Congress eventually passed the
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation
Act of 2010 (TRA 2010) which reinstated the estate tax for 2011 and 2012
with a $5,000,000 unified credit for both estate and gift taxes and put off to
2013 the possibility of a reversion to the 2001 estate tax levels.175 The TRA
2010 also introduced the concept of portability of the unified credit amount
between spouses.176 In general, a taxpayer’s unified credit amount can be
availed by only the taxpayer.177 If a taxpayer dies without consuming his
entire unified credit, the amount evaporates.178 For 2011 and 2012, a surviving spouse of a taxpayer may file an estate tax return upon the death of their
spouse, claiming the spouse’s remaining unified credit.179 In essence, and
assuming away inflation adjustments, a surviving spouse can combine her
unified credit with that of her most recent spouse to pass away, effectively
shielding $10,000,000 from the estate tax at her death.180 Though the portability provisions were initially set to expire on January 1, 2013, they were
made permanent by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.181
Disregarding portability, a standard estate plan for married taxpayers
seeks to utilize a decedent’s unified credit amount and to only employ the
marital deduction to the extent the value of a decedent’s gross estate exceeds the available unified credit.182 For example, assuming the first spouse
to die’s gross estate is $10,000,000, that the decedent had made no taxable
gifts, and that no other deductions or credits are available, the estate of the
first spouse to die might be split pursuant to a formula clause,183 as follows:
174. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §§ 302(a)(1), 303(a), 124 Stat. 3296 (codified at I.R.C. §
2010(c)(4)-(6) (2006)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Doug H. Moy, Special Report: Unused Spousal Exemption Amount: “There You
Go Again,” TAX NOTES, Nov. 14, 2001, at 847, 851, available at
http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/133tn.pdf.
178. Id.
179. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §§ 302(a)(1), 303(a), 124 Stat. 3296 (codified at I.R.C. §
2010(c)(4)-(6) (2006)).
180. Moy, supra note 177, at 851.
181. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313;
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, §§ 302(a)(1), 303(a), 124 Stat. 3296 (codified at I.R.C. § 2010(c)(4)-(6)
(2006)).
182. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lewis, How the Economic Growth & Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2001 Affects Basic Estate Planning Strategy, UTAH B.J., March 2002, at
21.
183. For a discussion of formula clauses, see Detzel, supra note 16, ¶ 1600.
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$5,000,000 to a credit shelter trust, free of estate tax liability due to the unified credit; the other $5,000,000 would fund a marital deduction trust, free
from estate tax liability in the estate of the first spouse to die due to the
marital deduction. The first spouse to die has passed $10,000,000, therefore, transfer tax free. If we further assume the surviving spouse in this scenario has never had any separate assets of her own, only the $5,000,000
marital deduction trust (assuming no inflation) will be in her gross estate
upon her death. The $5,000,000 in this trust will pass upon her death, also
free of estate tax due to the surviving spouse’s unified credit. The credit
shelter trust will not be included in the surviving spouse’s estate upon her
death, as the estate plan will not give her any interests in the trust to trigger
such inclusion. In this scenario, a total of $10,000,000 has passed unburdened by the transfer taxes.
If we assume away the fact of marriage in this scenario, at least
$5,000,000, the amount passed to the surviving spouse in a marital deduction trust, would have been subjected to the transfer tax upon the death of
the first spouse to die. Even if an unmarried, but long-term, couple employed a similar plan, they would be denied the marital deduction and the
attendant tax savings.184
Estate planning pursuant to the 50% marital deduction also required
formula planning.185 Estate plans would call for a division of the estate of
the first spouse to die into a share that was eligible for the marital deduction
and a second share for the property not so eligible.186 The estate planning
provisions related to both the 50% and 100% marital deduction added complexity to estate planning documents.
There are numerous other estate planning options available to married
individuals that are not provided to unmarried taxpayers.187 For instance,
married individuals may use the gift tax marital deduction to equalize the
value of the estates in order to insure the utilization of both spouse’s unified
credit amount.188 For example, if one spouse has property with a total value
of $10,000,000 and the other spouse has no property, the wealthy spouse
may make a transfer of $5,000,000 to the poor spouse, free of gift taxation
due to the gift tax marital deduction. Assuming no appreciation occurs and
the unified credit amount remains at $5,000,000, upon the death of each
spouse no estate tax will be due as a result of the application of each of their
unified credit amounts. Even assuming the unified credit amount goes down
and a more progressive rate table is established, such equalization will al184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
Crawford, supra note 19.
Id.
Crawford, supra note 19, at 795-97.
See, e.g., PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 77, § 5.9.
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low both spouses to take advantage to the fullest extent possible of the lowest portions of the rate table.
The possibility of portability may negate the need for estate equalization planning and for the trust arrangement described above.189 Under portability, the surviving spouse could receive all of the assets pursuant to the
marital deduction and then shield all of the assets upon her death from the
estate tax via the combination of the two unified credits.190 Given the longterm uncertainty regarding the provision of portability and other concerns,
however, the basic plan presented remains a viable approach to estate planning.191 If portability persists in the law, it is offered to only married taxpayers, justified by the same economic unit presumption as the estate tax
marital deduction.192
The ability to split gifts pursuant to section 2513 also provides married
individuals with an estate planning option denied to unmarried taxpayers.
Not all non-deductible transfers of property by gift193 are deemed taxable
gifts.194 Section 2503(b), for example, provides an exclusion from the definition of taxable gift of a transfer at or below a specified amount, currently
$13,000,195 if the transfer is of a present interest.196 Typically, if a taxpayer
transfers a present interest of $26,000, $13,000 of the transfer is excluded
from the determination of the taxable gift, leaving a taxable gift of $13,000.
If a married taxpayer makes such a transfer and his spouse elects to split the
gift with him, each spouse will be treated as if they transferred $13,000,
allowing each spouse to exclude their share of the gift. As a result, $26,000
has been transferred by someone that will never be the subject of a taxable
gift.197
189. Moy, supra note 177, at 851-54.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Section 2501 imposes a tax on the transfer of property by gift. I.R.C. § 2501
(2006).
194. See I.R.C. § 2503 (2006) (providing exclusion from the gift tax of certain types
of gifts); I.R.C. § 2502 (2006) (providing for the calculation of the annual gift tax liability by
multiplying the taxable gifts of an individual by the rate table provided in section 2502).
195. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006) (amount is indexed to inflation).
196. A present interest is an interest over which the recipient has a current economic
benefit. See United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941). The committee report explained
that the exclusion should be denied unless the donees of the transfer were ascertainable at
the time of the transfer and in the case of a transfer of a future interest due to the difficulties
“in many instances, of determining the number of eventual donees and the values of their
respective gifts.” H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 29 (1932).
197. PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 77, § 5.9. The annual exclusion was added to
the gift tax code in 1932 “to obviate the necessity of keeping an account of and reporting
numerous small gifts” made during the course of a year. H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 29 (1932).
The exclusion was “to fix the amount sufficient[ly] . . . to cover in most cases wedding and
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MARRIAGE AS THE PROXY FOR ECONOMIC UNIT

Marriage is the only proxy for an economic unit for purposes of the estate tax marital deduction.198 In order to obtain the deduction, in addition to
the statutory requirements discussed in Section 3, the estate will be required
to establish the testator was married at the time of his death199 and that the
property being made the subject of the deduction is passing to the surviving
spouse.200 Once the fact of marriage is established, however, the IRS will
not inquire into whether the married couple was functioning as an economic
unit.201 This is a good thing, as there is no guidance suggesting the contours
of such an inquiry.202
Marital status questions turn on state law,203 typically, though the federal Defense of Marriage Act204 currently limits the application of tax benefits, such as the marital deduction, to hetero couples.205 As a general matter,
if the taxpayer’s marriage is honored for state law purposes, it will be honored for estate tax deduction purposes.206 Even if a taxpayer is legally separated from his spouse or functioning under a judicial order short of a state
law issued divorce decree at the time of his death, the status of his spouse
for purposes of a marital deduction is unaffected.207

Christmas gifts and occasional gifts of relatively small amounts.” Id. Although established to
reduce administrative and compliance burdens associated with such transfers, estate planners
eventually hijacked the annual exclusion and use it as an estate planning device. Kelly
Moore, Proposal for Estate Tax Exclusion Provisions, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 37, 44 (2009).
Such use is consistent with the view of some that the annual exclusion is designed as an
incentive for making lifetime gifts. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356.
198. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2006).
199. S. REP. NO. 80-1013 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163.
200. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-1(b) (1958).
201. Indeed, the court will not inquire even in the face of an obvious breakdown of
the economic unit. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-368, 1956-2 C.B. 1027 (allowing a marital deduction despite legal separation).
202. See Crawford, supra note 19, at 792 & n.196; Motro, supra note 26, at 1523. (In
discussing an income tax proposal, “statistical evidence of marital sharing is subject to much
dispute. Data on income pooling within couples is scarce, is likely to be unreliable, and has
been interpreted as supporting as well as debunking the marital unity paradigm.”).
203. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60.
204. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at U.S.C. § 1738(C) (2006)).
205. Id. There have been recent attempts to repeal DOMA, but none came to a vote
in Congress. The Supreme Court recently granted cert in U.S. v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
206. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60.
207. Rev. Rul. 56-368, 1956-2 C.B. 1027; Eccles v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 1049, 1053
(1953).
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For instance, in Estate of Steffke v. Commissioner, the court held that a
decedent’s bequest to the woman he had most recently married before his
death did not qualify for the marital deduction because his divorce from his
prior wife was invalid.208 The divorce had not been challenged whilst the
decedent was alive, but the supreme court of his state determined that the
divorce, which had been obtained in Mexico, was invalid after his death,
disqualifying his supposed widow from inheriting under state law.209 The
tax court determined this was dispositive for estate tax purposes as well.210
Similarly, in Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner,211 the court determined
that a New York court’s refusal to honor a divorce granted in Mexico rendered the no-longer-divorced spouse the surviving spouse of the decedent
for estate tax purposes.212
Once the fact of marriage is established, the presumption that the taxpayer and his spouse are functioning as an economic unit is accepted.213
The basis for the economic unit presumption is found in various general
statements, such as “husband and wife should be treated as one economic
unit for purposes of the estate and gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax purposes.”214 If the IRS were to inquire into the actual economic
relationship of a married taxpayer, there is no baseline provided of what
level of economic relationship is required. A policy determination to allow
cohabiting couples, in general, to utilize this benefit if they prove to be
functioning as economic units would beg the broader question: what level
of economic sharing and related activity is required to prove such status?
The focus of this Article is not on this broader question. Instead, this Article
asks the discrete question of whether the presumption and related benefit of
the estate tax marital deduction should be rebutted and/or disallowed if a
married taxpayer’s economic relationship with his spouse is defined by a
prenuptial agreement. The absence of a baseline makes such a discussion

208. Estate of Steffke v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 530, 530 (1975), aff’d, 538 F.2d 733 (7th
Cir. 1976).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Estate of Spalding v. Comm’r, 537 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1976).
212. Estate of Goldwater v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 540 (1975), aff’d, 539 F.2d 878 (2d
Cir. 1976) (estate allowed a deduction for the value of the forced share received by a nolonger-divorced spouse).
213. Motro, supra note 26, at 1523.
214. S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 127 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 228;
see also, H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 159 (1981) (reflecting fear that inadequate tax planning
could result in spousal property being subjected to tax more than once in a spousal generation, the determination that spouses should be able to transfer property between themselves
without imposition of the tax, and that the 100% deduction would avoid administrative difficulties of accounting for jointly held property of spouses).
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difficult. For purposes of discussion, however, the state law provided protections against disinheriting spouses will be used as the baseline.
Marriage impacts the legal rights of each spouse by creating an obligation of support and placing some restrictions on the right to transfer property during life and at death.215 Whether a jurisdiction is a community property state or a separate property state, state law provides protections against
disinheritance to a surviving spouse.216 In community property jurisdictions, generally, property earned during the marriage becomes the community property of each spouse.217 For example, if a deceased individual had
$1,000,000 of community property titled in his name at death, $500,000 of
this property passed to his surviving spouse by operation of law.218 In this
way, the surviving spouse is protected from disinheritance and impoverishment.219
In common law states, spouses are provided an elective share to protect them from disinheritance and impoverishment.220 The spouse is given
the option of either taking what the decedent provided for in his will or a
statutorily defined share of the decedent’s estate.221 The elective share varies from state to state, and the nature of the property interest allowed to the
surviving spouse may differ as well.222 There are also issues regarding
whether the statutory share applies to property passing outside of probate
via a will substitute or perhaps transfers that had been made in fraud of
marital rights.223 Whatever the contours of a given state’s elective share
statute and related case decisions, however, after marriage the property of
each spouse is potentially subjected to an elective share claim upon his or
her death.224
Both the community property regime and an elective share regime are
premised on the fact that, for state law purposes, husband and wife form a
unit, both equally contributing to the economy of the unit.225 State law al215. Motro, supra note 26, at 1517.
216. Currently, there are nine community property states. Publication 555—
Introductory Materials, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/publications/p555/ar01.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2012).
217. See, WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1982).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2006) and accompanying
commentary.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 379 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va.
1989).
224. See, e.g., Simpson v. Sanders, 445 S.E.2d 93 (S.C. 1994).
225. See, UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2, general cmt.
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lows couples to deviate, however, from their property regimes by entering
into a prenuptial agreement.226 As will be discussed in Part VI, not all prenuptial agreements contain the same terms. For purposes of discussion, a
prenuptial agreement that alleviates the taxpayer from the state provided
protections against impoverishing the spouse will be considered a possible
instance where the economic unit presumption is rebutted.227
VI.

PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

Marriage impacts the legal rights of each spouse by creating an obligation of support and placing some restrictions on the right to transfer property during life and at death.228 These obligations and restrictions may be abrogated, however, by entering a valid prenuptial agreement.229
Prenuptial agreements are hardly a new legal device as they date back
to the sixteenth century.230 Early prenuptial agreements were notably different from those often seen today in that their primary focus was on what
would happen to the couple’s assets at death, not upon divorce.231 Furthermore, they were drawn up not to protect the assets of the husband, but rather to ensure the return of the wife’s assets to her family should she die
without issue.232
At common law, prenuptial agreements were limited to governing the
distribution of property upon the death of a spouse and did not apply in the
case of a divorce.233 This was due to the commonly held view that allowing
prenuptial agreements to include provisions dealing with the disposition of
assets upon divorce was against public policy as it would undermine the
stability of the marriage.234 American courts continued to decline to enforce
prenuptial agreements contemplating divorce in deference to this policy
view up through the 1960s.235 The past forty years have seen significant
change in how American courts have addressed the validity of prenuptial
226. Sherman, supra note 64, at 365-66.
227. The gift tax marital deduction could also be the subject of such a discussion,
perhaps focusing instead on any deviation from the state-provided rights and burdens upon
dissolution of the marriage.
228. Motro, supra note 26, at 1517.
229. Id.
230. Sherman, supra note 64, at 365-66.
231. Id. at 365.
232. Id. at 366.
233. J. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Winding Road from Form to Function:
A Brief History of Contemporary Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1, 33
(2008); Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 897 (1997).
234. Difonzo & Stern, supra note 233, at 33-34.
235. Sherman, supra note 64, at 375.
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agreements.236 Court enforcement of prenuptial agreements containing provisions that address divorce stems from a changing view of marriage from
that of a sacred union to a form of secular legal relationship.237 This is evidenced by the fact that the first cases to find prenuptial agreements contemplating divorce to be enforceable coincided with the advent of no-fault divorce.238
The rate at which couples execute prenuptial agreements is currently
on the rise. Depending on which study one examines, it has either increased
to 5% in the mid-1990s from 1% in the mid-1970s or to 3% in 2010 from
1% in 2002.239 The increase in the popularity of prenuptial agreements is
partially due to a shift in judicial preferences when it comes to divorce settlements toward favoring property division rather than granting alimony. 240
Moreover, high profile divorce cases illustrating the savings that could be
had through the use of a premarital agreement are also a siren song for
those possessing significant wealth.241
236. Id. at 375-83.
237. Id. at 392.
238. See, e.g, Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d. 381 (Fla. 1970), rev’d on other grounds,
257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); id. at 380-81. Public acceptance of the institution of divorce and
increased rates thereof have led to a change in how the public perceives prenuptial agreements providing for the disposition of property upon divorce in that they are now viewed as
legitimate contracts. Difonzo & Stern, supra note 233, at 35. Although most courts continue
to view prenuptial agreements as distinct from ordinary contracts, others take a more extreme position and treat prenuptial agreements just like any other contract. Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We
Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 162-182 (1998); Sherman, supra note
64, at 381-82. The 1983 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) provides an enforceable structure for premarital agreements and more certainty than the case-by-case approach
many state courts had been using in lieu of a controlling statute on the enforceability of
prenuptial agreements. Dennis I. Belcher, How to Tie a Tight Knot with a Marital Agreement, 35 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 4-3, 401.1 (2001). Thus far, the UPAA has been adopted by
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (1983),
Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted (Supp. 2009).
239. Laura Petrecca, Unromantic? Maybe, but Prenups Make Sense: Nearly OneThird of Those Surveyed Would Ask for One, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2010, at 6A; Sherman,
supra note 64, at 372.
240. Sherman, supra note 64, at 374.
241. Bix, supra note 238, at 146; Sherman, supra note 64, at 375. In addition to those
wedding for the first time, prenuptial agreements are also popular among those embarking
upon their second or a subsequent marriage. Sherman, supra note 64, at 373. In fact, individuals age 40-60 account for 65% of those who request their prospective spouses to sign
prenuptial agreements. Misty Harris, Couples Seek Made-to-Order Unions: Everything from
Petcare to Housekeeping Provisions Requested in Prenups, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE (Oct.
12,
2006),
http://www.aaml.org/sites/default/files/couples%20seek%20made%20to%20order.pdf. This
is due, at least in part, to the fact that older individuals usually have accumulated more
wealth than those marrying for the first time and the benefits in terms of familial harmony
that can be had when children from a prior relationship are assured that they will still take
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In addition to the tax concerns inherent in the execution of a prenuptial
agreement, prenuptial agreements contain provisions detailing the tax arrangement of the parties during the course of the marriage.242 For instance,
prenuptial agreements often provide for how income taxes are to be filed.243
This can be addressed in a simple fashion by a provision agreeing to cooperate in filing joint tax returns or by a considerably more complex set of
provisions.244 Couples contemplating filing jointly may even dictate the
allocation of any refund received.245 In addition, the parties may agree to
indemnify each other if an audit determines that they owe additional funds
on their joint return.246 Irrespective of filing status, the parties may choose
from their parent’s estate. Andre Katz & Amanda Clayman, When Your Elderly Clients
Marry: Prenuptial Agreements and Other Considerations, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 445, 451 (2000); Sherman, supra note 64, at 373.
242. Unless a transfer in contemplation of marriage is actually made at the time when
the prenuptial agreement is signed, there will be no tax consequences due to the act of signing the prenuptial agreement. Linda J. Ravdin & Marcia C. Fidis, Tax Aspects of Marital
Agreements, PDPA MD-CLE 6-1, § 6.16 (2009). Couples executing prenuptial agreements
should exercise care though when it comes to the timing of transfers envisioned by the
agreement because their transfers can determine whether or not the transfers qualify for the
marital deduction. Belcher, supra note 238, at 406.3. This point is illustrated by Farid-EsSultaneh v. Commissioner which states that releasing one’s marital rights does not count as
consideration for transfers made in anticipation of marriage and that such transfers will
therefore be subject to the gift tax. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm’r, 160 F.2d 812, 816 (2d Cir.
1947); Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 C.B. 227. However, it is possible to condition transfers on
the marriage actually occurring, which provides an avenue by which to skirt the timing issue
and qualify for the marital deduction. Belcher, supra note 238, at 406.3.
243. Virginia F. Coleman, Selected Issues in Planning for the Second Marriage,
SR016 ALI-ABA 151, 227 (2009).
244. GARY N. SKOLOFF, RICHARD H. SINGER, JR. & RONALD L. BROWN, DRAFTING
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS, IV-71 (Supp. 1999). A prenuptial agreement may require joint
filing. Katz & Clayman, supra note 241, at 460; SKOLOFF, supra note 244, at IV-70. Or, the
parties may agree in the prenuptial agreement to give one of the spouses the responsibility
for determining whether they will file jointly or separately. SKOLOFF, supra note 244, at IV97. A prenuptial agreement can even prohibit joint filing if the parties separate without divorcing. Id. at IV-93. The prenuptial agreement may require one spouse to shoulder the
entire income tax burden. Id. at IV-85. Alternatively, a prenuptial agreement may require
each spouse to pay the portion of income tax liability which would be owed on their earnings
had the couple filed separately should they elect to file jointly. Cenovic v. Cenovic, No. A09-238, 2010 WL 4237928, *10 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2010). Additionally, if the parties
are combining households, they may include provisions related to the capital gains taxes
owed upon the sale of the home belonging to the spouse who moves into the other’s home.
SKOLOFF, supra note 244, at VIII-69. For example, the high-earning spouse may agree to
pay the entire amount due on their joint income tax return, except for taxes stemming from
the sale of the home of the less wealthy spouse. Id. at VIII-69.
245. Cenovic, 2010 WL 4237928, at *10; SKOLOFF, supra note 244, at IV-85 to -86.
246. SKOLOFF, supra note 244, at IV-86 to -87. While it is often advantageous to file
jointly, the parties may, for one reason or another, agree to a provision in their prenuptial
agreement stipulating that they must file their tax returns separately. Id. at IV-95. When
filing separately, both spouses must either elect to itemize or they must both file jointly. As
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to include a provision in their prenuptial agreement stipulating that income
taxes traceable to items of separate property shall be paid out of separate
property assets and that which is traceable to marital property be paid out of
marital property assets.247
Even though an annual election has to be made on one’s gift tax return, a couple may include a provision in their prenuptial agreement consenting in advance to splitting gifts to third parties.248 In addition to establishing a gift-splitting regime, a prenuptial agreement may also contain a
provision compensating the less wealthy spouse for the use of his or her
unified credit if issues later arise relating to the valuation of gifts, which
would push the value of the gifts beyond the annual exclusion amount.249
Prenuptial agreements provide an avenue to protect an individual’s
probate estate from their surviving spouse’s elective share claim.250 As
such, prospective spouses may choose to include a provision in their prenuptial agreement mutually waiving their elective share claims.251 Limiting
the surviving spouse’s access to his or her elective share can also serve to
assure children from a prior relationship that the motivation of the prospective spouse in entering the marriage is not their parent’s wealth, thereby
enhancing familial harmony.252 Furthermore, “a ‘marriage condition’ is
included to provide that the death provisions are superseded by the divorce
provisions contained in the marital agreement in the event that the parties
are not living together at the death to one spouse or if divorce proceedings
had been already commenced by either party.”253
VII.

REBUTTING THE ECONOMIC UNIT?

The use of marriage as a proxy for economic unit status offers efficiencies to the tax system.254 As it is only a proxy, its use triggers the possibility that a tax benefit may be provided to taxpayers who do not satisfy the
underlying requirement of functioning as an economic unit. It is accepted
such, they may include a provision in their prenuptial agreement governing which spouse is
to make this election. Id. at IV-98. If the parties either agree to mandate separate filing or
leave open the option of filing separately, they may also chose to include a provision in their
prenuptial agreement governing the division of household deductions. Id. at IV-94 to -95.
247. Id. at IV-98.
248. Coleman, supra note 243, at 165; Mary H. Schmidt & Christopher H. Suh,
Marital Agreements, in 2 A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING IN MASSACHUSETTS §
12, § 12.6.6 (2009).
249. Coleman, supra note 243, at 200.
250. Belcher, supra note 238, at 400.2.
251. Katz & Clayman, supra note 241, at 453.
252. Belcher, supra note 238, at 400.2; Katz & Clayman, supra note 241, at 451-52.
253. Schmidt & Suh, supra note 248, § 12.6.6.
254. See, e.g., supra notes 43-44..
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for this Article that, generally, the efficiencies justify the toleration of such
possibility.
The economic unit presumption is based on an underlying belief that
married individuals share the economic burdens associated with the marriage.255 For discussion purposes, this Article explores this presumption
based on the restriction the act of marriage places upon a decedent’s testamentary freedom, either as a result of community property laws or the elective share. As a result of the presumption, married individuals are provided
the benefit of a 100% estate tax marital deduction that is not provided to
single individuals.256 Based on the premise that marriage is a set package of
rights and responsibilities, it is fair to assert that if one accepts the burdens,
they are entitled to the benefits.257 If, however, they deny the burdens, by
enacting a prenuptial agreement, arguably they are not entitled to the benefits. This is an old concept; the idea that one who refuses to sustain a burden
ought not to derive its benefit dates to the Justinian code.258 From this perspective, the benefit of the estate tax marital deduction should be denied if a
prenuptial agreement is executed limiting the burdens associated with marriage. As such, burdening the wealthier spouse by placing a cost on ending
a marriage (i.e., denying marriage-related tax benefits) ought to be one of
the burdens of this benefits and burdens package.259 As a counter-argument,
however, it has been posited that marriage is more than economics, more
than a legal fiction: it is an intimate and reciprocal relationship.260
The mere possibility that a prenuptial agreement could exist has been
offered as one of the reasons for jettisoning the economic unit presumption
for bestowing tax benefits.261 When a prenuptial agreement does exist, this
argument is made stronger. As the above discussion of possible prenuptial
agreement terms indicates, parties may abrogate whatever level of property
sharing and burdening that is attendant to a marriage under state law, in the
first place, while at the same time divvying up the tax benefit spoils.262
Should these benefits be allowed when the agreement arguably removes
their underlying justification?
Allowing married individuals to obtain the benefit of a marital deduction without exposing their estates to possible control by their surviving
spouses runs counter to the general purpose of the estate tax of breaking up
accumulations of wealth. It is true the QTIP provisions allow a decedent to
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Motro, supra note 26, at 1518; Richards, supra note 33, at 621.
Motro, supra note 26, at 1512.
Sherman, supra note 64, at 384.
Id. at 384-86.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 388.
Motro, supra note 26, at 1521; Richards, supra note 33, at 621.
See supra Parts III, IV, VI.
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avail the estate tax marital deduction without providing the surviving
spouse privately with such control,263 but the underlying state laws persistently provide for such control,264 unless contracted away in a prenuptial
agreement.
To the extent the marital deduction provisions were motivated by the
desire to simplify the gross estate issues involving property held in the entireties or in right of survivorship between just the spouses, this Article posits such issues will be the province of the prenuptial agreement. Even if the
prenuptial agreement does not provide the answers for these types of issues,
section 2040(b) will. Although section 2040(b) is based on the same economic unit presumption, if such property is held by the spouses outside of
the terms of the prenuptial agreement, this Article’s acceptance of marriage
as a proxy, generally, suggests there is no need to rebut the presumption for
such uncovered property.
Using the state-provided rules against disinheriting a spouse as the
baseline for the existence of an economic unit, a prenuptial agreement deviating from this baseline rebuts the presumption. If rebutted, the 100% marital deduction seems inappropriate. Accepting that other baselines are possible, once established, deviation from any baseline rebuts the justification
for the presumption, arguably rendering the 100% deduction inappropriate.
If the 100% marital deduction is disallowed in the face of certain prenuptial agreements, what is the result for the taxpayer? The 50% marital
deduction was not created based on the economic unit presumption.265 Instead, it was enacted in response to inequities between married taxpayers in
community property states and those in common law states.266 Perhaps a
reenactment of some version of the 50% deduction would be necessary for
those who are denied the 100% deduction. As discussed earlier, the current
marital deduction provisions are complex. The concurrent existence of a
50% marital deduction would add further complexity.
Use of marriage as a proxy for bestowing tax benefits is a simple approach. The lack of a baseline, in the first place, and the reliance on a proxy
allow for a less complex imposition of the estate tax than would a regime
requiring a detailed inquiry into whether the married couple is acting as an
economic unit, however defined. Should this simplicity be abandoned in
some or all situations involving prenuptial agreements?
Not all prenuptial agreements contain the same terms.267 Should the
estate tax marital deduction be disallowed based on the mere existence of a
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

26 U.S.C.A. § 2056(b)(7) (West 2006).
See supra text accompanying notes 234-67.
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
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prenuptial agreement without reviewing the terms of the agreement? In
addition, a prenuptial agreement acts as a floor regarding what a spouse
must leave to the survivor.268 Should the IRS be required to compare the
actual terms of the agreement with what the deceased individual finally
provided for his surviving spouse? Requiring the IRS to make any of these
types of inquiries as a result of limiting the marital deduction when a prenuptial agreement is involved would most likely be administratively inefficient. Given that administrative efficiency concerns may provide the
strongest argument against requiring the IRS to determine if a married couple is actually functioning as an economic unit, requiring such inquiries as a
result of a possible denial of the deduction seems equally objectionable.
If a detailed inquiry into the precise terms of a prenuptial agreement or
actual property distribution is not to be made, an alternative would be to
deny the deduction based on the mere existence of the prenuptial agreement, perhaps based on the presumption that such an agreement tends to
deviate too much from the burdens and obligations otherwise provided by
state law. Just as the grant of benefits based on the economic unit presumption may tend to grant such benefits too broadly, a denial of this sort may
deny them too broadly. Whereas it may be appropriate to bestow a tax benefit too broadly as a result of a presumption, it seems too harsh to deny said
benefits too broadly based on a counter presumption.
Another alternative would be to establish a hybrid approach between
requiring a case-by-case analysis of each situation involving a prenuptial
agreement and having an irrebuttable presumption that the existence of a
prenuptial agreement precludes treating the married couples as economic
units. Perhaps, a rebuttable presumption could be employed. This Article
posits this would trigger the same types of factual inquiries the current approach evinces intent to avoid.
It is true the surviving spouse will obtain the bargained-for benefits
upon the death of the first spouse.269 If the benefits are presented to the surviving spouse in the appropriate form, the current marital deduction provisions shield the benefit from estate taxation upon the death of the first
spouse.270 Why not deem the married couple an economic unit to the extent
of such a benefit, no matter its scope? This would result in an allowance of
the deduction, as is currently the case. This seems appropriate, given the
artificial construct of relying on spousal inheritance rights to determine
economic unit status, but ignores the broader policy justification of bestowing the deduction on married couples because they are functioning as economic units. Most prenuptial agreements deal with divorce and other rights
268.
269.
270.

See supra notes 257-58.
See supra notes 257-58.
See supra note 4.
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beyond inheritance rights, which, though not discussed in this Article,
would necessitate a broader set of inquiries to determine a baseline of economic unit status.271
The canons of just taxation include “[t]he [c]anon of [s]implicity,
which dictates the tax system should be simple, plain and intelligible to the
common taxpayer. The tax should not be complicated. It should be simple
to understand as to how it is to be calculated and how much is to be
paid.”272 Many of the arguments to repeal the transfer tax focused on the
complexity of the tax, compliance difficulties, and other inefficiencies
caused by the tax.273 The use of marriage as a proxy for the economic unit,
forestalling the need to conduct any inquiries into the actual economic relationship between the married couple, avoids complexity and limits the
compliance concerns. The state-imposed burdens on a married individual’s
property are not overly burdensome, in the first place, and the use of marriage as a proxy evinces intent to avoid such inquiries. If such inquiries
were to be conducted in cases involving prenuptial agreements, even if justified by the underlying policy arguments, the introduction of additional
complexity and related compliance pressures would be unacceptable insults
to the canon of simplicity and efforts to reduce compliance burdens associated with the tax code.
It is true that, given the current unified credit amount of $5,000,000,
any attendant complexities would be foisted upon the small percentage of
taxpayers who have wealth levels sufficient to trigger a transfer tax liability.274 For the vast majority of taxpayers, whether they are married pursuant
to a prenuptial agreement or not, a transfer tax liability is not currently on
the horizon.275 However, given the uncertainty surrounding the amount of
the unified credit in the future and the absence of a well-defined baseline
271. See Jeffrey A. Baskies, A Practical Guide to Preparing and Using Premarital
Agreements, 27 EST. PLAN. 347 (2000); see, e.g., Weisfeld-Ladd v. Estate of Ladd, 920 So.
2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding language in a prenuptial agreement that a
wife agreed to “not claim or acquire any interest in any [of her husband’s] property during
the marriage or in the event of dissolution of the marriage” was a waiver of both dissolution
rights and elective share rights).
272. 2 R.K. SURI, J.K. BUDHIRAJA & NAMITA RAJPUT, A TEXTBOOK OF I.S.C.
ECONOMICS 378 (2005).
273. Reginald Mombrun, Let’s Protect Our Economy and Democracy from Paris
Hilton: The Case for Keeping the Estate Tax, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 61, 61-62 (2007); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System,
112 YALE L.J. 261, 262 (2002).
274. Steve Wamhoff, State-by-State Estate Tax Figures: Number of Deaths Resulting
in Estate Tax Liability Continues to Drop, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE (OCT. 20, 2010),
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/estatetax2010.pdf (state-by-state estate tax figures show that the
President’s plan is too generous to millionaires, indicating that in 2009, only 0.6% of deaths
triggered an estate tax liability when the unified credit amount was 3,500,000).
275. Id.
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with which to measure the economic unit presumption, the efficiencies offered by the status quo are stronger than any benefit to be gained by more
precisely matching the award of the benefits of the 100% marital deduction
with couples actually satisfying the underlying presumption. Even if a baseline could be crafted, the underlying inquiries would be too great to justify
the abandonment of marriage as a proxy.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Using the state law protections against spousal disinheritance as the
baseline for determining the existence of an economic unit, it is defensible
to consider a prenuptial agreement deviating from the baseline as rebutting
the existence of the economic unit. So rebutted, the attendant estate tax
marital deduction seems unwarranted. Concerns over estate tax issues involving jointly held spousal property also seem minimized when the affairs
of the parties are governed by a prenuptial agreement. Allowing a wealthy
spouse via contract to maintain control over his wealth, without exposing it
to the possibility his spouse may elect or otherwise obtain the property,
seems counter to the estate tax goal of breaking up large concentrations of
wealth. There would be efficiency concerns associated with such an inquiry, however, and, admittedly, other baseline measurements would need
to be considered.
If we accept the economic unit justification for the provision of a
100% marital deduction in the estate tax code, generally, the current approach of not attempting to account for the existence of prenuptial agreements remains the most efficient approach. It is true that prenuptial agreements tend to move away from state-imposed obligations toward customized requirements,276 theoretically undercutting the basis for the economic
unit justification. All prenuptial agreements are not created equally, however, and to fully determine if they deviate from the underlying state law requirements to a sufficient extent to warrant denial of the deduction presents
administrative burdens.277 In addition, the absence of a legislated baseline
indicating precisely what constitutes an economic unit in the first place, and
the fact that the state-imposed obligations are not as onerous as the economic unit presumption suggests to begin with, would vex any attempt to determine if the deviation justifies denial of the deduction.
The tautology used in this Article for discussion purposes belies the
complexity associated with evaluating and tracking the economic relation-

276.
277.

See Difonzo & Stern, supra note 233.
See, e.g., supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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ship between spouses.278 It is this complexity that some have relied upon to
justify the marriage as a proxy approach to begin with.279 This Article criticizes the use of the economic unit presumption and suggests a baseline be
developed but offers no such baseline. If a baseline could be determined
and evaluated with administrative ease, not only would certain prenuptial
agreements lead to a conclusion that the economic unit does not exist, but
marriages in general could be so evaluated. Moreover, if the marital deduction provisions were repealed altogether, this baseline could provide the
necessary guide to judge whether gratuitous transfers had been made between spouses. Until such a baseline is developed, however, the simplicity
of using marriage as a proxy is justified. A discussion of the Federal
DOMA and various state laws barring same-sex marriage is beyond the
scope of this Article. Given these bars to same-sex marriage, however, consideration of additional proxies seems appropriate.280

278. Not discussed in the Article is the possibility of defining economic unit more
broadly, perhaps including the entire nuclear family as part of the unit. See Crawford, supra
note 19, at 792-94; Motro, supra note 26, at 1549 (such a discussion is beyond the scope of
this Article).
279. See McMahon, supra note 42, at 718.
280. Crawford, supra note 19, at 795-96; Motro, supra note 26, at 1556-57.

